PRODUCTION DECISIONS WITH UNCERTAIN MARKETS: THE CASE OF BT CORN by Hurley, Terrance M. & Olson, Kent D.
Production Decisions with Uncertain Markets: The Case of Bt Corn 
 
Selected Paper 
American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting  




Terrance M. Hurley, Assistant Professor, 
Department of Applied Economics 
Room 249c Classroom-Office Building 
1994 Buford Avenue 
University of Minnesota 







Kent Olson, Professor of Economics, 






The effect of marketing uncertainty due to consumer opposition over genetically 
modified (GM) grain is modeled in the context of a producer’s decision to plant GM.  
The model shows that a tendency to plant less GM acreage and obtain premium prices for 
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Consumer opposition to genetically modified (GM) crops appears to be spilling over 
from the European Union (EU) to other parts of the world.  The crops of concern are 
those engineered by inserting one or more genes from another species.  Opposition to 
these crops stems from unknown health and environmental risks and other ethical 
concerns.  Due to this opposition, labeling requirements for products containing GM 
grain currently exist in the EU and will soon exist in Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and 
South Korea.  Other countries, including the U.S., are debating whether labeling is 
appropriate.  Even though labeling is not required in the U.S., Archer Daniels Midland 
Company and others encouraged producers to segregate GM and Non-GM grain in the 
fall of 1999.  Companies such as Gerber, Heinz, and Frito Lay have also announced 
intentions to use Non-GM grain for at least some of their processed foods. 
  The effect of increased consumer opposition to GM grain is an intensification of 
current trends toward segregation, identity preservation, and market premiums.  A survey 
of Midwestern grain elevators conducted by the Sparks Company in the fall of 1999 
found 11 and 8 percent segregating corn and soybean, with 1 and 3 percent offering 
premiums for Non-GM corn and soybean.  Various media and marketing reports suggest 
premiums ranging from $0.05 to $0.10 and $0.05 to $0.35 a bushel for Non-GM corn and 
soybean in some markets. 
Commodity grain is no longer commodity grain.  Instead, a tiered market appears 
to be developing.  These tiers differentiate Non-GM and GM grain.  The structure of this 
market is characterized by a one way substitution for producers.  Non-GM can always be 
sold in GM markets, but GM can not be sold in Non-GM markets.  As a result, the price   2
for Non-GM should never be less than the price of GM.  The complex structure of this 
developing market further complicates production decisions and seed choice. 
  Only a few studies have assessed the effect of GM crops on market structure 
(Klien, Kerr, and Hobbs, 1998) and planting decisions (Pimental and Ali, 1998; and Hyde 
et al., 1999).  Furthermore, these studies do not formally consider the potential for tiered 
markets due to consumer opposition.  The purpose of this paper is to more formally 
characterize a tiered market with one way substitution and develop a model for producer 
planting decisions given this market structure.  The market characterization shows how 
aggregate production, the distribution of production between GM and Non-GM, and 
demand conditions will affect market prices and Non-GM premiums.  It also serves to 
highlight the sources and implications of uncertainty faced by producers.  The producer 
model shows how risk aversion and market expectations will influence acreage 
allocations between GM and Non-GM crops. 
  The results show that the expectation of a market premium for Non-GM will 
discourage producers from planting GM.  A more interesting result however is that risk 
aversion does not necessarily further discourage producers from planting GM crops.  In 
fact, a risk averse producers may plant more GM seed than an otherwise identical risk 
neutral producers.  The reason for this result is that both the costs and benefits of planting 
Non-GM are uncertain.  If the benefits are more uncertain than the costs, producers with 
greater risk aversion will be less inclined to plant Non-GM.  Alternative, if the costs are 
more uncertain than the benefits, producers with greater risk aversion will be more 
inclined to plant Non-GM.   3
Market Characterization 
Consumer opposition to GM grain is resulting in a tiered market of differentiated 
products.  Suppose the demand for GM, QGM, is a decreasing function of the price of GM 
and an increasing function of the price of Non-GM: QGM = G(P, P + d) where P > 0 is the 
GM market price and d ‡ 0.0 is the Non-GM market premium received by producers after 
adjusting for differences in costs due to Non-GM market certification, transportation, and 
segregation.  The demand for Non-GM grain, QNon, that is adjusted for differences in 
costs, is an increasing function of the GM price and a decreasing function of the Non-GM 
price: QNon = H(P, P + d).  Let Y be the aggregate supply and 1.0 ‡ F ‡ 0.0 be the 
proportion of aggregate supply that qualifies for the Non-GM market.  Let 1.0 ‡ W ‡ 0.0 
be the proportion of qualified Non-GM actually sold in the Non-GM market.  Equating 
supply and demand determines the equilibrium GM price and Non-GM premium: 
(1)  YWF  = H(P, P + d) and 
(2)  Y(1 - F) + Y(1 - W)F  = G(P, P + d).   4
P* and d* are equilibrium solutions to equations (1) and (2).  Two possible scenarios can 
emerge. 
With an excess supply of Non-GM at the equilibrium GM price, there is no GM 
premium: Y = G(P, P) + H(P, P).  In this instance, it is almost as if no market 
differentiation exists.  The only difference is any additional cost of certifying, 
transporting, and segregating Non-GM grain.  Increases in supply will serve to decrease 
the equilibrium price.  To support this intuition, it is sufficient to assume the magnitude 
of the own price elasticities of demand exceed the magnitude of cross price elasticities. 
  With an excess demand for Non-GM at the equilibrium GM price, premiums will 
emerge: YF  = H(P, P + d) and Y(1 - F) = G(P, P + d).  The comparative static results 
reported in Table 1 show how the GM price and Non-GM premium will depend on 
aggregate supply, the proportion of Non-GM supply, and own and cross price elasticities 
of demand.  Assuming the magnitude of the own price elasticities exceed the magnitude 
of cross price elasticities, the GM price decreases with an increase in aggregate supply 
and the Non-GM premium decreases as the proportion of Non-GM supply increases.  
These are intuitive price responses to increasing supplies. 
It is less clear how GM premiums will respond to an increase in aggregate supply 
because the result depends on the relative magnitudes of own and cross price elasticities.  
To illustrate these confounding effects consider a special case where cross price 
elasticities are 0.0.  That is, GM is not a substitute for Non-GM at any price.  An increase 
in the aggregate supply drives the price lower.  If the elasticity of demand in the GM 
market is greater than that in the Non–GM market, the GM price will fall faster than the 
Non-GM price and a larger premium can result.  Alternatively, if the elasticity of demand   5
in the Non-GM market is greater than that in the GM market, the Non-GM price will fall 
faster than the GM price and a smaller premium will result. 
It is also unclear how increasing the proportion of Non-GM supply will affect the 
GM price.  Increasing the proportion of Non-GM supply will reduce the supply in the 
GM market if market premiums are being offered.  This initial supply side effect will put 
upward pressure on the GM price and downward pressure on the Non-GM premium.  
However, with relatively cheaper Non-GM grain some GM buyers may choose to 
substitute buying more Non-GM and less GM, which will put downward pressure on the 
price of GM.  The net result is therefore ambiguous. 
An important lesson to learn from this market characterization is that the GM 
price and Non-GM market premiums are uncertain to the producer when planting 
decisions are made.  This uncertainty is attributable to unknown production levels, 
limited information on how much Non-GM acreage will be planted, and volatile demand 
conditions for Non-GM grain.  Furthermore, the GM price and market premiums for 
Non-GM could be either positively or negatively correlated depending on the strength of 
the own and cross price elasticities and the proportion of Non-GM supply. 
Producer Decisions with Uncertain Markets 
The characterization of a tiered market highlights important factors influencing the GM 
price and Non-GM premium.  These factors include aggregate supply, the proportion of 
Non-GM supply and the own and cross price elasticities of demand.  Producers are 
accustomed to price uncertainty due to variations in aggregate supply and the elasticity of 
demand.  The commercialization of GM grain and the emerging tiered market due to 
consumer opposition to GM products add new factors for consideration that substantially   6
complicate the production decision.  To understand how this new market uncertainty will 
affect production, a stylized decision model for a producer’s acreage allocation between 
GM and Non-GM production is developed. 
  Let y ‡ 0.0 and (1 - d)y ‡ 0.0 be GM and Non-GM per acre yields.  For d >(<) 0.0, 
the GM crop is relatively more (less) productive.  Let c + f ‡ 0.0 and c ‡ 0.0 be the GM 
and Non-GM per acre cost of production.  For f >(<) 0.0, the GM crop has a higher 
(lower) production cost.  Yields and production costs are assumed known by the producer 
in order to focus on market uncertainties.  Let fc ‡ f ‡ 0.0 be the proportion of acreage 
devoted to GM production where fc is the maximum allowable proportion of GM acreage 
permitted.
1  A is the total acreage available for production.  As before, P is the GM price 
and d is the Non-GM premium.  Both are assumed to be unknown when acreage 
allocations are made due to market uncertainty.  The joint density function is g(P, d) with 
distribution G(P, d) where PU ‡ P ‡ PL and dU ‡ d ‡ 0.0.  The Non-GM market premium 
will never be less than 0.0 because the producer can always sell Non-GM grain in the 
GM market. 
  Producer profit is p  = A[Py – c – f + (1 – f)(f + dy (1 – d) – Pyd)].  Py – c – f is 
the average profit per acre of GM.  For each acre of Non-GM planted, costs and revenues 
change by the additional cost of planting GM, f, the difference in the market price 
received on the Non-GM yield, – dy(1 - d), and the difference in revenues due to 
differences in the GM and Non-GM yields, Pyd.  The expected utility of profit is 
                                                                 
1 Some GM crops have planting restrictions.  For example, growers are required to plant refuge corn with 
Bt corn for insect resistance management.  These restrictions are handled by restricting f to be sufficiently 
less than fc, which is reasonable if the refuge crop qualifies for sale in the Non-GM market.  If the refuge 
crop would typically fail certification for sale as Non-GM due to cross-pollination or some other reason, the 
lower costs and yields of refuge can be subsumed into y and f.   7
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where U(￿) is twice continuously differentiable and increasing in income, and E[￿] is the 
expectation operator defined over the joint distribution of P and d.  The first order 
necessary conditions for the optimum proportion of GM acreage are 
(4)  E[A(Pyd – f – dy(1 – d))U’(p)] - l £ 0.0, 












, f £ fc, and (fc - f)l = 0.0 
where l is a lagrangian multiplier that restricts the portion of GM production to be less 
than fc.  If ydE[PU’(p)] >(<) fE[U’(p)] + y(1 – d)E[dU’(p)], the expected marginal utility 
of planting GM is greater (less) than that of planting Non-GM and the optimum 
allocation is f* = fc (f* = 0.0).  If an interior solution exists and second-order conditions 
are satisfied, equation (4) can be rewritten as 
(5)  ydE[PU’(p)] = fE[U’(p)] + y(1 – d)E[dU’(p)]. 
It is useful to interpret the left-hand-side of equation (5) as the cost of an option 
for greater market access.  This cost reflects the expected marginal value of the potential 
loss in revenues in order for the producer to enjoy greater market access.  The right-hand-
side can be interpreted as the value of the option for greater market access.  This value 
includes the marginal value of a decrease in per acre production costs and the marginal 
value of increased revenues due to greater market access and potential market premiums. 
It is important to note that the option for greater market access differs from a 
more conventional marketing option that is designed to mitigate risk.  The cost of the 
Non-GM market option can entail greater rather than less uncertainty due to price   8
variations.  Alternatively, the value of the option can entail more rather than less 
uncertainty due to variations in the market premium.  Therefore, a producer may very 
well view the purchase of this option for greater market access as increasing rather than 
decreasing profit variability or risk. 
The first question of interest is whether producers will plant more or less GM seed 
given a tiered market and the potential for Non-GM premiums.  To answer this question, 
it is useful to compare equation (5) to ydE[PU’(p)] = fE[U’(p)], which results when no 
market premiums is available.  When ydE[PU’(p)] = fE[U’(p)] + y(1 – d)E[dU’(p)], 
ydE[PU’(p)] ‡ fE[U’(p)] because y(1 – d)E[dU’(p)] ‡ 0.0.  This means that for the same 
E[PU’(p)] and E[U’(p)] the availability of a market premium will result in f* £ fc, while 
without a market premium f* = fc.  Therefore, the availability of a market premium will 
tend to reduce the amount of acreage producers devote to GM assuming the price of GM 
with and without premium is the same.  This result is quite intuitive and consistent with 
the March 2000 planting intentions released by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA).  These planting intentions indicate a 25 percent decline in 
proportion of Bt corn acreage from about 33 percent 1999 to an intended 19 percent in 
2000.  Bt corn is genetically modified to manufacture its own insecticide for the control 
of the European corn borer. 
Another interesting question is whether a risk averse producer is likely to reduce 
GM acreage more than an otherwise identical risk neutral producer.  To answer this 
question it is useful to rewrite equation (5) as  
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(6)  ydE[P] = f + y(1 – d)E[d]  
      + y(1 – d) [Cov(d,E[U’(p )|d])] / E[U’(p )]  
      – yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p )|P])]}/ E[U’(p )] 
where Cov(￿,￿) is the covariance operator defined over the distribution of P or d.  Since 
E[U’(p)|d] and E[U’(p)|P] are decreasing in d and P for a risk averse producer and 
constant for a risk neutral producer, Cov(d,E[U’(p)|d]) and Cov(P,E[U’(p)|P]) will be 
negative for a risk averse producer and 0.0 for a risk neutral producer.  Therefore, when 
ydE[P] = f + y(1 – d)E[d] for a risk neutral producer such that fc ‡ f*  ‡ 1.0, ydE[P] >(<) 
f + y(1 – d)E[d] + y(1 – d) [Cov(d,E[U’(p)|d])] / E[U’(p)] – yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p)|P])]}/ 
E[U’(p)] as y(1 – d) [Cov(d,E[U’(p)|d])] / E[U’(p)] – yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p)|P])]}/ E[U’(p)] 
<(>) 0.0.  Hence, the risk averse producer will choose f* = fc when y(1 – d) 
[Cov(d,E[U’(p)|d])] / E[U’(p)] – yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p)|P])]}/ E[U’(p)] < 0.0 and f* = 0.0 
when y(1 – d) [Cov(d,E[U’(p)|d])] / E[U’(p)] – yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p)|P])]}/ E[U’(p)] > 0.0.  
The implications of these results are that it is not clear whether a risk averse producer will 
reduce GM acreage more than an otherwise identical risk neutral producer.  It all depends 
on the covariance of the price and marginal utility of income and the covariance of the 
market premium and marginal utility of income. 
However, suppose that a producer can lock in a market price for GM grain prior 
to planting, then yd [Cov(P,E[U’(p )|P])]}/ E[U’(p )] = 0 and f* = fc.  That is, a risk averse 
producer will plant more GM than the risk neutral producer.  This result at first seems 
counter intuitive because planting Non-GM for greater market access does seem prudent.  
However, by locking in a price for GM grain, the cost of the option for greater market 
access becomes certain, while the value of the option remains uncertain.  If this is the   10 
case, planting more Non-GM is similar to paying a premium for greater risk.  Admittedly, 
there is value to the producer in incurring greater risk because a higher price is expected.  
However, due to this added risk, a risk averse producer is less likely to plant Non-GM 
than a risk neutral producer. 
Alternatively, suppose a producer can lock in a market premium prior to planting.  
Then yd [Cov(d,E[U’(p )|d])]}/ E[U’(p )] = 0, which implies f* = 0.0.  Now a risk averse 
grower will plant proportionally less GM than a risk neutral grower.  By locking in a 
market premium, the producer assures the value of the option for greater market access, 
while the costs of the option remains uncertain.  In this situation, producers reduce risk 
and obtain a higher price on average by purchasing the option.  Therefore, a risk averse 
producer will be more inclined to buy this option than a risk neutral producer. 
These diametric examples serve to demonstrate the importance of the degree of 
uncertainty a producer faces with respect to the cost and value of greater market access.  
If the producer is more uncertain about the cost, he/she is likely to plant more Non-GM. 
If the producer is more uncertain about the value, he/she is likely to plant more GM. 
Conclusions 
Consumer opposition to GM crops, crops that have been genetically engineered with a 
gene from another species, is complicating planting decisions by creating a tiered market.  
While producers can always sell their Non-GM grain in the GM market, they can not sell 
their GM grain in the Non-GM market.  The purpose of this paper was twofold.  First, we 
characterized the emerging tiered market for GM and Non-GM grain and then discuss the 
implications of this market structure on the price of GM grain and market premiums for 
Non-GM grain.  Second, we explored how this tiered market will affect planting   11 
decisions and the role risk attitudes and producer expectations will play in influencing 
GM production. 
  We show how the emergence of market premiums will depend crucially on the 
aggregate supply, the proportion of Non-GM supply and demand, and own and cross 
price elasticities of demand.  While it is clear that the GM price will likely be correlated 
with the Non-GM market premium, it is unclear whether this correlation will be positive 
or negative because it depends on the own and cross price elasticities of demand and the 
proportion of Non-GM supply.  We find that the expectation of market premiums will 
likely reduce the amount of GM acreage planted.  However, a more interesting result is 
that a risk averse producer may be less inclined to reduce GM acreage than an otherwise 
identical risk neutral producer.  By planting Non-GM, a producer secures the option for a 
market premium should one arise.  The value of this option is uncertain because no one 
knows if premiums will emerge.  The cost of this option is also uncertain, since it 
depends on the GM price, which will also be influenced by the emergence of Non-GM 
premiums.  If the value of this option is more uncertain than the cost, risk averse 
producers will be less likely to plant Non-GM.  Alternatively, if the cost of this option is 
more uncertain than the value, a risk averse producer will be more inclined to plant Non-
GM. 
  The market characterization and producer decision model developed in this paper 
provides a useful framework for evaluating the likelihood and magnitude of a market 
premium for Non-GM grain, information that would be prized by producers.  To 
accomplish this objective, future research needs to focus on decomposing the demand for 
commodity grain into GM and Non-GM components.  Additional work also remains to   12 
understand how government programs will affect planting decisions within this new 
market structure.  While the discussion has focused on GM versus Non-GM production, 
the models and results are equally applicable to any identity preserved market, such as 
that for high oil corn or Synchrony Treated Soybeans.   13 
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 Table 1: Comparative static effects when market premiums for Non-GM exist. 
  GM Price (P)  Non-GM Premium (d) 
Aggregate Production (Y)  ( ) 0
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= e  are the cross price elasticities of demand for the GM and Non-GM markets; and D 
= eG eN - eGN eNG > 0 by assumption. 
 
 